Britain on the Global Stage 2025
Re-arming, re-industrialising, the rise of the right and what if America leaves NATO....
The post-Cold War consensus is over. Where the Fukuyama thesis that liberal democracy triumphed over totalitarian alternatives has long been criticised, the thesis that America will remain the sole global super power and guarantor of global security, seems no longer to be true.
The events on Friday were upsetting for people who considered the role of global statesmen to be just that, statesmen. My point in response has been that the pro-Russian rhetoric has been coming out of the American right for some time and is an indicator of what is probably to come.
Where does this leave Britain though? What does global co-operation and security look like going forward? And what does it mean for domestic politics and policy here in the UK? Let me synthesise a few points that have come up in conversations
The ‘Peace Dividend’ is no longer - In previous blog posts (see below) I have spoken about the trend in spending after the cold war away from defence and towards social protection schemes. We now spend well over £400 billion (nearly 50% of our total public spend) on welfare and social protection (including the NHS).
This Government’s plan to increase defence spending to 2.7% of GDP requires roughly £15 billion in extra spending. Any plan to go to 3% or 4% of GDP will require additional 10’s of billions of investment on top of that. It is incredulous, impractical and negligent to suggest this can be delivered entirely through economic growth and debt accumulation. Irrespective of what you think of welfare spending, rules of public finance must be obeyed, because if they are not, economic crisis will follow leaving individual states and Europe weaker as a result. Part of Putin’s advantage in Ukraine has been capitalising on European fiscal weakness in the aftermath of the Eurozone debt crisis, and our dependence on Russian energy supplies. Relying on debt markets and deficits for national security is about as sensible as relying on Russia for petroleum and gas.
Where does this leave America - The Trump isolationist mentality is nothing new in America. This is a country that erred before entering World War 2, still bears the scars of it’s decision to enter Vietnam, chose not to support the UK in it’s defence of the Falkland Islands, and got terribly burnt in it’s excursion to Afghanistan. Pair this with a Republican elite that see’s non-NATO countries outside the G8 as, frankly, ‘shithole countries’ whose only value can be linked to mineral and natural resources, and you have the recipe for a complete upending of the global order. Trump reflects long-term changes in American public sentiment. 20 years ago 4-in-5 US people saw America playing a a major role in world affairs, now that figure is closer to 2-in-3, still a majority, but far fewer. The question of America playing a leading role has fallen from one-third to 20%. Of course Republican’s are less likely to suggest the US play a major role. There is nothing to suggest this trend will change in the future. This leaves the case for American foreign aid, intervention, and diplomacy in a precariously weak state in Washington DC. Britain therefore has to ready itself for the US to differentiate it’s response to foreign aggression. I still have confidence that were Russia to bomb navy bases in Scotland or launch a cyber-attack in Germany, NATO with the US are it’s core, would respond. But Poland, Latvia and Lithuania might be different, with the current White House questioning the long term strategic importance of smaller countries.
How do we build resilience against foreign aggression - Russian expansionism, its own version of Lebensraum, will not end with the Donbas, Kherson and the Dneiper River as a new border. As long as Putin is alive, he will see geographic expansion as a primary purpose of his presidency. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are on stand-by. And where military force cannot deliver physical expansion, Russian diplomacy will likely prioritise states with a strategic purpose; Iran, India and Syria are obvious targets. Many also say it is a matter of time until China launches an aggressive strategic assault on Taiwan. We indeed live in times as dangerous as any since the height of the Cold War. A fundamental risk to Britain’s ability to stand tall on the international stage is a lack of political and moral capital at home. Foreign enemies will look at domestic political fragmentation and delight at the opportunity it presents them to launch initiatives, like they have in Ukraine, without fear of retribution. The British public are tired after our excursion in to Afghanistan, low economic growth, crumbling public services and a polarisation of communities that has precipitated the demise of our social contract. The popular meme below sums up the situation.
Britain therefore needs to focus on repairing problems we have here at home. The economy has to grow, our public services have to improve, immigration has to be controlled and reduced, and a sense of fairness and equity reinstalled in the British social contract. Our collective failure to do so, will result in the continued surge of populism which could come from either the extreme right or left. We are seeing this currently through a rise of ‘far-right’ parties across Europe. And for whatever credibility their arguments on immigration and taxation are, their world view is far from a moral mainstream one that guarantees British security in the long-term.
